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Abstract 
This article analyses the effectiveness and prospects of the Eastern Partnership in the 
context of its ten-year implementation and the results of the Brussels Summit of 2017. 
The paper focuses on the current stage of the progress of the EaP partner states and the 
internal challenges of their development. A significant part of the article is devoted to 
Russia’s influence on the Europeanisation process of the Eastern European countries 
and the weak incentives from the EU towards these countries. The Normative Power 
concept was used to analyse the EU-Eastern European countries bi- and multilateral 
relations within the Eastern Partnership co-operation, taking into consideration that the 
EU norms and regulations’ implementation in Eastern Europe do not guarantee political 
normalisation in these countries. We conclude that after ten years of functioning, the 
Eastern Partnership has little capacity to influence political elite, domestic and regional 
processes in Eastern Europe, because depoliticised functional approach and the EU 
long-term incentives are not enough for the partners.  
 
Keywords: Eastern Partnership, European Union, reforms, eastern neighbours, 
association agreements. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) will celebrate ten years of its existence 
by the end of 2018. On December 3, 2008 the European Commission issued a 
message with the same name having initiated a new conceptual basis for the 
EU’s co-operation with six states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine
1
. However, the EaP founding summit took place only in 
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early 2009, on the 7
th
 of May in Prague
2
. The first decade of the EaP, especially 
its second half, was marked by the most difficult period in the relations between 
the EU and its eastern neighbours since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The 
Russian military invasion of Ukraine, including the annexation of Crimea and 
the aggression in the Donbas, the low effectiveness of the reforms even in the 
EaP “avant-garde” countries such as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, have 
clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of the original EaP concept and the tools 
that may have been suitable in 2008 but are already inadequate after a decade. 
The Fifth EaP Summit, which took place on November 24, 2017, 
demonstrated that despite its overall weak format, it remains a stable basis for 
EU relations with its eastern neighbours. The results of the summit have shown 
the EU’s reluctance to bring any major changes to the EaP in the near future, 
but it is still experiencing a new and important stage of its evolution, 
considering the recent entry into force of the Association Agreements between 
the EU and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. 
There is a consensus of researchers on the need for the review of the 
EaP. There are, however, discussions are on the preferable directions of its 
further transformation. Pointing out the slight chances of a serious EaP reform 
in the near future, most authors suggest the ways to make it more functional 
within existing instruments. For example, Andrew Wilson considers the 
transition to a “status quo plus” approach in EU relations with its eastern 
neighbours, including access to the single market, strengthening the “physical” 
ties between the partner countries and the EU, etc
3
. Max Fras suggests that the 
EU should continue its course on technical assistance, development co-
operation, support of independent media, and others
4
. At the same time, some 
researchers, such as Jana Kobzova, Grzegorz Gromadzky, Leonid Litra, Irakli 
Porchkhidze, keep on claiming that in order to be successful, the renewed EaP 
should be much more politically oriented and less technical than it is today, 
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School of Social and Political Sciences, Lisbon, Portugal (dmytro.s.tyshchenko@gmail.com). 
1  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
“Eastern Partnership”, European Commission, 3 December 2008, http://ec.europa. 
eu/external_relations/eastern.docs/com08_823_en.pdf. 
2  Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, Prague, 7 May 2009, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107589.pdf. 
3  Andrew Wilson, “Partners for Life: Europe’s Unanswered «Eastern Question»”, European 
Council on Foreign Relations, 07 October 2017, http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/ 
summary/partners_for_life_europes_unanswered_eastern_question_7232 - Last accessed 
on 28 June 2018. 
4  Max Fras, “Weak but stable: The future of the EU’s Eastern Partnership ahead of the 2017 
summit”, The London School of Economics and Political Science, Blog post, 17 
November 2017, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/11/17/eastern-partnership-
summit-2017-weak-but-stable/. 
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despite the apparent continuation of the pragmatic and technocratic approach of 
the EU towards the realisation of the EaP in the near future
5
. 
This article analyses the evolution of the EaP after the first decade since 
the initiative was launched using the theoretical approach offered by the 
analyses, which consider the EU as a normative model for other regions 
(Manners). We focus upon the current stage of the EaP’s progress reflected in 
the final declaration of the Brussels Summit and its perspectives. The main 
research questions are: Is the EU ready to propose the move forward? Are the 
EaP Partner States ready to progress in their relations with the EU?, and Does 
the EaP have prospects to become an effective model for the gradual and partial 
integration of the eastern neighbours with the EU? 
In this sense, we identified three main problems or deterrents that 
hinder such a move forward and the use of the full potential the initiative 
possesses for a much deeper transformation of the EU’s eastern neighbourhood. 
First of all, there are internal challenges for the sustainable transformation of the 
EaP countries such as money seeking interests of the elites, systemic corruption, 
and ineffective state institutions. Secondly, the Russian influence counterbalances 
the EU’s Europeanisation impact in the region. Finally, there is a weakness of 
the EU’s incentives to support domestic reforms in the partner countries. 
This paper is organised into four sections. The first section describes the 
development of the Eastern Partnership initiative since its origin in 2009 up to 2018, 
and the theoretical framework used to analyse it. While the second and third sections 
describe the internal challenges in the development of the EaP partner states and 
Russia’s influence in Eastern Europe, the final part of the paper is devoted to 
presenting the weak incentives of the EU for the Eastern European countries. 
 
 
Evolution Of The Eastern Partnership: From Prague To Brussels 
 
The EaP emerged because of the gradual evolution of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) regarding the countries of Eastern Europe and the 
South Caucasus. It became the first comprehensive initiative within the EU’s 
external relations system directed to six countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood 
                                               
5  Jana Kobzova, “Easing the EU’s Eastern Partnership fatigue”, European Council on 
Foreign Relations, 08 November 2017, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_ 
easing_the_eus_eastern_partnership_fatigue. Grzegorz Gromadzki, “The Eastern 
Partnership after Five Years: Time for Deep Rethinking”, European Parliament, Policy 
Department DG External Policies, 21 February, 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/536438/EXPO_STU(2015)536438_EN.pdf.  
Leonid Litra and others, “Eastern Partnership renewal. Recommendations for the 2017 
Eastern Partnership summit,” IPRE, 2017, http://www.ipre.md/eapttf2017/ 
Background%20Paper.pdf. 
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of the united Europe. At the same time, despite the fact that the Polish-Swedish 
proposals of
  
May 23, 2008 were initially innovative, the final format of the 
initiative took the form of the smallest “common denominator” and became an 
attempt of minimalist answers to the Polish ambitions of the formation of the 
EU’s eastern policy as there are differences in the approach of the EU member 
states towards relations with the eastern neighbours
6
. The most important and 
far-reaching component of the Polish proposals, the recognition of the prospect 
of EU membership for the Eastern European States, is not present in the EaP, and 
the level of co-operation in practical spheres has been defined too generally
7
. 
The EaP proposed a way for the gradual and partial integration of the 
partner states with the EU based on their progress in internal reforms aiming at 
strengthening European values such as democracy, human rights, principles of 
the rule of law, and others. The novelty of its bilateral dimension was that it 
provided opportunities for the development of relations, which the EU had 
previously offered Ukraine, for all its eastern neighbours: association 
agreements, deep free trade areas, visa liberalisation, integrated institutional 
development programmes, etc
8
. The instruments provided within the 
multilateral dimension (summits, the Council of Ministers, thematic platforms, 
working panels, flagship initiatives, the Civil Society Forum, Euronest, etc.) 
have become completely new to the region
9
. 
The EaP, programmed this way from the very beginning, left the 
following question open: What should happen if any partner country 
implements the envisaged reform programme (europeanizes itself) and becomes 
compatible with the EU? Some EU member states like Poland, other Visegrád 
Group countries, the Baltic States, and Scandinavia, proceeded from the 
position that the EaP format could help the target countries really come closer to 
the EU and prepare them for possible full integration in the future
10
. Other EU 
members saw the EaP from the beginning as an alternative to enlargement or “a 
waiting room”, where the post-Soviet countries of Eastern Europe and the South 
Caucasus would finally be able to determine the paradigm of their further 
development
11
. Insignificant interest or even scepticism of most EU countries to 
this project left its implementation on the European Commission and some of 
                                               
6  Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, Propozycja Polsko-
Szwedzka: Partnerstwo Wschodnie, May 2008, http://www.msz.gov.pl/files/ 
PARTNERSTWO%20WSCHODNIE/1PL.pdf. 
7  Joint Declaration ... cit., Prague, 7 May 2009, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ 
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107589.pdf. 
8  Communication from the Commission … cit., 3 December 2008. 
9  Idem. 
10  Tetiana Sydoruk, “The positions and interests of Member States in creation the current 
European Union Eastern policy”, Scientific Notes of Ostroh Academy National University, 
series «International Relations» 2, 2010, pp. 67-68. 
11  Ibidem, p. 70. 
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the activist countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Sweden, and the 
Baltic countries. A good evidence of such an attitude is the geography of the 
EaP Summits: Prague in 2009, Warsaw in 2011, Vilnius in 2013, and Riga in 
2015. Only Estonia, chairing the EU Council in the second half of 2017, refused 
to host the Fifth Summit. Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for European 
Neighbourhood Policy & Enlargement Negotiations, called it a “wise decision”, 
because Brussels hosting the summit “is a clear signal that all EU members 
stand for strong political and economic relations with their eastern partners”12. 
Over the past decade, the EU has repeatedly attempted to reconsider 
individual instruments of the EaP under the ENP reforms initiated by the 
Commission’s messages such as “A New Response to Changing Neighbourhood” 
dated May 25
th
, 2011
13
 and “Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy” 
on November 18
th
, 2015
14
, as well as the results of the five summits. 
The most important stage in redefining the EaP came after the Vilnius 
Summit on the 28
th
-29
th
 of November 2013, when the initiative turned into a 
crushing defeat. Two months before, Armenia refused to continue co-operation 
concerning the preparation of the association agreement with the EU, followed 
by Ukraine, a geopolitically key state in the region, bigger in terms of 
population and GDP than any other five EaP partners all together, that refused 
to sign the already prepared agreement. Further events followed such as – 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the Russo-Ukrainian conflict in Donbas that 
erupted in 2014, which have radically changed the situation in Eastern Europe, 
most ominously in the security sphere. 
At the next summit, on the 21
st
 and 22
nd 
of May 2015 in Riga, the EU 
hoped to rehabilitate it after a geopolitical defeat in Vilnius as well as renew 
and strengthen cooperation with the partner countries. The summit’s Joint 
Declaration contains indeed a broad list of priorities of 30 points about co-
operation and dialogue, which are aimed at long-term, comprehensive reforms 
and modernisation of the participating countries. This partnership should start 
with the association agreements implementation with Georgia, Moldova and 
Ukraine. It is the main priority of the EU and partner countries for the coming 
years. The relations should be extended to developing intentions of closer co-
                                               
12 Vitaliy Yeremitsa, “‘Eastern Partnership’: far-sighted and dynamic or short-sighted and 
slowed down?,” Radio svoboda, 23 November 2017, https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/28870397.html. 
13  A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood. Joint Communication by the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European 
Commission, European Commission, 25 May 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/world/ 
enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf. 
14  Review of the European Neighbourhood, Joint Communication to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and Policy. the 
Committee of the Regions, European External Action Service, 18 November 2015, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/2015/151118_joint-communication_review-of-the-
enp_en.pdf. 
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operation in the fields of energy, business and entrepreneurship, transport, 
etc.
15
. However, the Riga Summit demonstrated at the same time further 
deepening of the split of the partner states of the programme. The most striking 
evidence of this was the refusal of Armenia and Belarus to sign the summit’s 
final declaration condemning Russia’s annexation of Crimea. As a result, the 
EU had to differentiate its position and the EaP countries on this issue
16
. We 
fully agree with Hrygoriy Perepylytsia mentioning that  
 
“in Riga, Putin received a second victory over the EU after Vilnius in the struggle for 
the implementation and development of the Eastern Partnership. Armenia, Belarus and 
Azerbaijan have finally become entrenched in the sphere of Russian influence, and no 
declarations of intent to adhere to the principles of democracy, human rights and 
European values for these countries are no longer relevant”17. 
 
During these years, there were, however, some positive adjustments to 
the EaP. In particular, a clearer connexion between EU’s assistance and reforms 
in the partner countries according to the “more for more” principle18 and 
partnerships between neighbouring countries’ societies were strengthened. 
There was also an enhancement of support for non-governmental organisations 
in partner countries
19
 the emphasis on the question of stabilisation and reforms 
became clearer, and the co-operation in the security area of security
20
. 
The Brussels EaP summit of November 24
th
, 2017, marked two more 
years of uneasy relations between the EU and its eastern neighbours. During 
this time, pro-European Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine reached the most 
important bilateral EaP goals – in June 2014, they signed the EU Association 
Agreements (AA) together with deep and comprehensive free trade areas. The 
agreements with Georgia and Moldova entered into force on the 1st of July 
2016 on a permanent basis, and the one with Ukraine only on September 1, 
2017, after delaying the ratification process in the Netherlands as a result of the 
                                               
15  Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Riga, 21–22 May 2015), European 
External Action Service, http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/riga-declaration-220515-
final_en.pdf. 
16  Ibidem. 
17  Hrygoriy Perepelytsia, “Putin’s victory in Riga,” TSN, 26 May 2015, 
http://tsn.ua/analitika/rizka-peremoga-putina-429583.html. 
18  A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood. Joint Communication by the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European 
Commission, European Commission, 25 May 2011, http://ec.europa.eu/world/ 
enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf. 
19  Ibidem. 
20  Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Joint Communication to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, European External Action Service, 18 November 2015, 
http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/documents/2015/151118_joint-communication_review-of-the-
enp_en.pdf. 
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referendum on the 6
th
 of April 2016. The paths of Georgia and Moldova to these 
agreements were relatively easy, whereas the Ukrainian path to association with 
the EU was the most complicated and the longest. Still, for all three countries, 
the preparation and signing of the AAs with the EU was the key to maintaining 
a permanent pro-European course in their foreign policy. In addition to the 
AAs, but as an independent process, all three states have reached visa-free 
regime with the EU. Apart from it, Georgia and Moldova have already gained 
access to the European Common Aviation Area, which is likely to be open for 
Ukraine as well. 
Unfortunately, for the “AA Club”, as these countries were named by 
Max Fras, there are no strategic guidelines in their relations with the EU in the 
near future
21
. The AA implementation implies years of intense reforms and 
gradual integration with the use of existing instruments. Rapid rapprochement 
with the EU, not even talking about joining it, is extremely unlikely in the 
visible perspective. 
Another group of states (Azerbaijan, Belarus and Armenia) seems to 
have stabilised their weak relations with the EU in recent years through other 
types of agreements. Despite the entry of Armenia into the Eurasian Economic 
Union in October 2015, the EU began negotiations on a Comprehensive and 
Expanded Partnership Agreement signed at the EaP Summit in Brussels. The 
trade part of this agreement, unlike the AA, does not contain the most important 
component, the free trade area, and is adapted to the Armenian obligations 
within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union. Nevertheless, it 
provides a possibility to start negotiations on joining the Common Aviation 
Area and the visa regime liberalisation, requiring additional funding from the 
EU
22
. In February 2017, the EU began negotiations on a Comprehensive and 
Enhanced Partnership Agreement with Azerbaijan. The state has been suffering 
in recent years from economic hardship, weakening of the local currency and 
reducing revenues from oil and gas, so it tries to intensify participation in 
certain spheres of the EaP, namely in economic co-operation
23
. The relations 
between the EU and Belarus also experienced some improvements. After 
Aleksandr Lukashenko released all the political prisoners in August 2015, in 
February 2016, the EU lifted almost all sanctions against Belarus, in particular, 
against 170 people and 10 companies associated with the local authorities
24
. 
However, signing an agreement similar to the Armenian variant should not be 
expected in the near future because it is the only Eastern European country that 
                                               
21  Max Fras, “Weak but stable … cit.”. 
22  Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Brussels, 24 November 2017), 
Council of the European Union, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31758/final-
statement-st14821en17.pdf. 
23  Max Fras, “Weak but stable … cit.”. 
24  Leonid Litra and others, “Eastern Partnership renewal”. 
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did not even sign the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU. At 
the same time, the relations between the EU and Belarus are developing within 
the framework of the EaP’s multilateral dimension; the human rights dialogue is 
in progress, and, since April 2016, a new co-ordination group for a bilateral 
dialogue on various issues is in place
25
. 
The above analysis allows us to determine the actual division of the 
region into associate (AA group) and non-associate partners. Moreover, if we 
talk about the prospects for developing relations with the EU, it is paradoxical 
that the second group of states has more cautious optimism than the first one as 
they have stabilised these relations in recent years and have more or less clear 
plans for further movement. Consequently, the EU should more than ever focus 
on relations with those eastern partners that have already reached the goals of 
the EaP and are now ready to co-operate more closely and integrate with the 
EU. The implementation of the AAs by Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine is, 
without a doubt, a major challenge for the coming years, but it may lose its 
influence on these countries without clear political signals over further 
development of the relations with the EU. 
There were many hopes concerning the Brussels EaP Summit, as 
numerous political, scientific, expert and public debates on the directions of its 
transformation and the provisions of the final declaration showed. The results of 
the summit revealed that the most sceptical views came true – there was no 
radical reconsideration of the policy. Its final declaration is rather a soft mix of 
general assurances about the shared commitment to its goals and the support of 
the EU partner countries in a limited number of reform areas
26
. None of the 
ambitious ideas such as the European Parliament’s presentation of “The Eastern 
Partnership+” (including creation of a trust fund, a new European investment 
plan, a mechanism for financial support for AAs implementation for Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine)
27, or Lithuania’s “Marshall Plan for Ukraine”28 had 
support by EU leaders due to the political opposition in the EU member states 
and resource constraints. 
There are eight important aspects of the summit’s declaration that 
should be discussed. First of all, it does not mention, as expected, the 
recognition of the prospect of EU membership for Georgia, Moldova and 
                                               
25  Ibidem. 
26  Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Brussels, 24 November 2017), 
Council of the European Union, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31758/final-
statement-st14821en17.pdf. 
27  “President of European Parliament called for creation of ‘Eastern Partnership Plus» 
model’, Front News Intenational, 24 November 2017, https://frontnews.eu/news/ 
en/18129/President-of. 
28  Serhiy Sydorenko, “Commissioner Hahn against Marshall Plan: the idea of large-scale 
assistance to Ukraine loses its support,” Europeiska pravda, 27 October 2017, 
http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2017/10/27/7072834/. 
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Ukraine, while, at the same time, in relation to Ukraine there is a reference to a 
December 2016 decision by the EU Heads of State or Government
29
, which 
states that “[…] the Agreement does not confer on Ukraine the status of a 
candidate country for accession to the Union, nor does it constitute a 
commitment to confer such status to Ukraine in the future”30. 
Secondly, it includes a statement about the recognition of these 
partners’ European aspirations and European choice, but the wording in 
paragraph 10 limits these aspirations and this choice to the framework of the 
AAs implementation and the “political association and economic integration” 
formula
31
. Therein lies a powerful reason for a pessimistic conclusion about the 
influence of the “Dutch factor”32 on the EaP’s evolution towards preventing its 
development in the neo-enlargement policy. 
Thirdly, for the second time since Riga, Ukraine failed to achieve 
official recognition of the participants that Russia is an aggressor country; 
instead, as in the declaration of the previous summit, the EU only supported the 
territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of all the partners
33
. Vladimir 
Makei, The Foreign Minister of Belarus, in one of the interviews expressed his 
proudness that “Belarus has clearly stated that it will not tolerate any anti-
Russian provisions in the final declaration of this summit”34. 
In the fourth place, the “multi-speed approach” to the EaP has not been 
introduced. It only mentions the enhanced differentiation in bilateral relations 
with each of the partner countries
35
. Nevertheless, the actual division of the 
region into two groups of countries according to their internal dynamics, 
                                               
29  Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Brussels, 24 November 2017), 
Council of the European Union, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31758/final-
statement-st14821en17.pdf. 
30  European Council. European Council Conclusions on Ukraine, 15 December 2016, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/24151/15-euco-conclusions-ukraine.pdf. 
31  Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Brussels, 24 November 2017), 
Council of the European Union, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31758/final-
statement-st14821en17.pdf. 
32  In the Dutch referendum, held on 6th April 2016, over 61% of the voters rejected the 
ratification of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine despite having 
limited impact on the AA with Ukraine signed in 2014. The main problem is that 
Ukrainian citizens could feel unwanted in the EU despite all the sacrifices they have 
suffered, and this might welcome back the pro-Russian forces into power. 
33  Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Brussels, 24 November 2017), 
Council of the European Union, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31758/final-
statement-st14821en17.pdf. 
34  Belarus stated that it is not going to be friends with the EU to the detriment of Russia, 
Glavcom, 12 January 2018, https://glavcom.ua/news/bilorus-zayavila-shcho-ne-
zbirajetsya-druzhiti-z-jes-na-shkodu-rosiji--465431.html. 
35  Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit (Brussels, 24 November 2017), 
Council of the European Union, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31758/final-
statement-st14821en17.pdf. 
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obligations and ambitions within the EaP is obvious. The reason is that the EU 
does not want to create preconditions for the pro-European group of states of 
the bloc to be candidates for something more in relations with the EU. 
The fifth aspect is that “The EU’s incentive-based approach (‘more-for-
more’) will continue to benefit those partners most engaged in reforms”36, but 
this principle does not ensure higher integration for those who have done more, 
it just adds a higher financial assistance. 
The sixth aspect is that the EU is not focused on deeper security co-
operation with its partners: apart from the general statement on “the 
involvement and enhanced role of the EU in resolving conflicts”, in a phrase 
about the possibility of a direct EU presence (in conflict regions) it is added that 
the presence will be ensured only if necessary and important to strengthen the 
dialogue on security issues and defence
37
. Of course, the EU diplomats are right 
when they affirm that the EaP is not a tool for resolving conflicts, but the lack 
of instruments to respond to security problems in the region reduces the 
effectiveness of EU’s influence. 
A seventh issue is that one of the most important statements of the 
declaration is the approval of “20 deliverables for 2020”, first presented in 
December 2016 by the Commission and revised in June 2017, which are aimed 
at enhancing regional stability, strengthening human contacts, infrastructure, 
energy co-operation, etc.
38
. The implementation of these tasks will strengthen 
the ties between the EaP and the EU, but they indicate that the EU will still 
prefer to pursue a technocratic, pragmatic approach in relations with partners 
and avoids strategically and politically ambitious tasks. Finally, in the absence 
of more ambitious tasks, the declaration envisages increased co-operation in the 
spheres of education, science, support of independent media, the strengthening 
of strategic communications, and the involvement of civil society, etc.
39
. 
In general, the summit confirmed the weak but stable state of the EaP 
and did not give it a new breath because it will continue to “boil over low heat”. 
We will analyse the main factors that restrain the further evolution of the EaP 
and/or negatively influence its effectiveness. 
New theoretical approaches concerning the EU treat it as a normative 
model for other regions of the world. The controversy about the role of the 
European Union in the system of international relations appeared with the 
introduction of the term of “civilian power” proposed by Duchêne who believes 
                                               
36  Ibidem. 
37  Ibidem. 
38  Ibidem. 
39  Ibidem. 
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that economic power would be extremely important for the promotion of 
European interests
40
. 
Moreover, the concept of “Normative Power Europe” used by Manners 
refers to not only the fact that the EU can achieve goals without military power, 
but also that the goals of the EU are normatively anchored in a Kantian 
philosophy. The EU has both norms it wishes to promote and a normative way of 
achieving them. According to Manners, the EU is special because it not only 
wants to promote norms, but also promotes the norms via a normative process 
characterized by common principles and a willingness to disregard notions of 
“state” or “international”41. Manners’ main argument is that the international role 
of the EU as a promoter of norms does not fit in the classical English School 
division of states in either military or civilian powers. He claims that the 
developments of the 1990s in international relations lead to rethinking the notions 
of military and civilian powers, thus transforming the EU into a new type of 
power, normative power. The EU as a normative power does not rely on military 
power to set the standards of international politics, and it is not even civilian 
economic means that are the core of EU power, instead, “power becomes an 
effect of norm leadership and persuasion”42. By the idea of normative power, Ian 
Manners suggests that the EU is not only constructed on a normative basis, but 
that the concept predisposes the EU to act in a normative way in international 
relations. The notion of the EU normative power is constructed on the argument, 
that “the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not 
what it does and what it says, but what it is”43. In this regard, the EU becomes a 
promoter of democracy and human rights, social justice, sustainable economic 
development, solidarity, rule of law and good governance. Then, the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership represent European interests by 
creating a ring of well-governed states. 
The normative mechanism of the Eastern Partnership initiative is based 
upon certain benefits that will only be granted after the partner states implement 
the EU rules, standards and norms. Furthermore, the EU normative power in 
Eastern Europe has two main tasks: the first one is the rapprochement of the 
partner countries with the EU despite the lack of membership perspective; the 
second one is to ensure the security of the EU when the partner states would 
neutralise the challenges arising from the disadvantaged and poorly managed 
neighbours. 
 
                                               
40  François Duchêne, “Europe’s Role in World Peace”, Richard Mayne (ed.), Europe 
Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, Fontana, London, 1972, p. 43. 
41  Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol. 40. no. 2, 2001, pp. 235-258. 
42  Ibidem. 
43  Ibidem. 
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Internal Challenges For Sustainable Transformation Of The 
EaP Countries 
 
“Increasingly, his (Poroshenko’s) administration is transforming new Ukraine into a mirror image 
of the old Ukraine. European leaders should not provide geopolitical fig-leaves for this 
regression.” 
(Gustav Gressel, Senior Policy Fellow at the ECFR Berlin Office)44 
 
Despite the fact that some associated partners such as Georgia, Moldova 
and Ukraine achieved progress that is proved by the entry into force of the AAs 
and the introduction of a visa-free regime, the low effectiveness of the practical 
implementation of the reforms remains one of the main reasons for the criticism 
of these states and reduces the enthusiasm of Brussels and the European capitals 
to spend political capital and financial resources for any significant 
improvement of the EaP. 
The EaP aims to facilitate the implementation of the reforms in the 
participating countries. The nature and results of internal reforms are central 
variables that determine the level of co-operation between the EU and its 
partner countries. However, as the experience of implementing the initiative for 
almost ten years shows, this task became a “Sisyphean Task” in the EaP. 
Moreover, the EU is not its cause. The bases of most problems that hamper the 
reforms effectiveness are systemic corruption, opportunistic interests of the 
elites and ineffective state institutions of the partner countries. For example, 
three years after the “Revolution of Dignity”45 in Ukraine, whose participants 
sought to implement many of the reforms supported by EaP since its start in 
2008, critics accuse the Ukrainian authorities of “counter-revolution” against 
key reforms
46
. Moldova, which was recently considered by the EU as the EaP 
“success story”, is now an opposite example, which shows that “Europeanisation” 
                                               
44  Gustav Gressel, “Ukraine on the brink of kleptocracy”, European Council on Foreign 
Relations, 05 January 2018, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_ukraine_on_the_ 
brink_of_kleptocracy. 
45  The Revolution of Dignity (Euromaidan Revolution) is a series of violent events that took 
place in Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014 and which resulted in more than a hundred 
victims and the ousting of President Viktor Yanukovych, and of the Ukrainian 
Government. The Revolution began when the President refused to sign the Association 
Agreement with the EU at the EaP Vilnius Summit of November 2013. Tens of thousands 
of citizens protested against this decision defending their European aspirations. Apart 
from supporting the European integration course, the protesters demanded the resignation 
of the Government and early parliamentary and presidential elections, as well as the 
punishing of those responsible for the use of force by authorities on peaceful protesters. 
46  Ibidem; Andrew Wilson, “Partners for Life” …cit. 
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can become a synonym to corruption when the pro-European path of development is 
a screen under which the authorities cover a range of acts of corruption. 
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine have shown some progress in the 
introduction of the European norms and standards in many areas, but their 
implementation, ensuring the sustainability and irreversibility of internal 
transformation and Europeanisation are still a problem. This issue causes doubts 
about the success of their systemic changes. The analysis of annual reports on 
“Nations in Transit” published by Freedom House for the last ten years since 
the emergence of the EaP (2008-2017) shows that the index of democracy in six 
participating countries (see Table 1) remained at the same level and, in some 
countries, such as Azerbaijan and Ukraine, it even declined. Countries that had 
hybrid regimes ten years ago (Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine) remained the same. 
In the last decade, all of them have experienced violent political changes, but 
their political systems have not changed. Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Armenia 
even consolidated authoritarian regimes during this period. 
 
Table 1. Democracy Index in EaP Countries in 2008-2017 
Country 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Armenia 5,21 5,39 5,39 5,43 5,39 5,36 5,36 5,36 5,36 5,39 
Azerbaijan 6 6,25 6,39 6,46 6,57 6,64 6,68 6,75 6,86 6,93 
Belarus 6,71 6,57 6,57 6,57 6,68 6,71 6,71 6,71 6,64 6,61 
Georgia 4,79 4,93 4,93 4,86 4,82 4,75 4,68 4,64 4,61 4,61 
Moldova 5 5,07 5,14 4,96 4,89 4,82 4,86 4,86 4,89 4,93 
Ukraine 4,25 4,39 4,39 4,61 4,82 4,86 4,93 4,75 4,68 4,61 
Sources: Freedom House, “Nations in Transit” (2017), https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-
transit/nations-transit-2017. 
 
If we analyse the indicators according to some criteria used by Freedom 
House and compare the situation 10 years ago and today (see Table 2), the 
situation looks even more disappointing. 
 
Table 2. Indices of Some Freedom House Criteria in EaP Countries in 2008-2017 
 National 
Democratic 
Governance 
Electoral 
Process 
Civil Society Independent 
Media 
Local 
Democratic 
Governance 
Judicial 
Framework 
and 
Independence 
Corruption 
Country 2008 2017 2008 2017 2008 2017 2008 2017 2008 2017 2008 2017 2008 2017 
Armenia 5,25 6 5,5 6 3,5 3,75 5,75 5,5 5,5 5,75 5,25 5,5 5,75 5,25 
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Azerbaijan 6 7 6,5 7 5,25 7 6,25 7 6 6,5 5,75 7 6,25 7 
Belarus 7 6,5 7 6,75 6,5 6,25 6,75 6,75 6,75 6,75 6,75 7 6,25 6,25 
Georgia 5,75 5,5 4,75 4,5 3,5 3,75 4,25 4 5,5 5,25 4,75 4,75 5 4,5 
Moldova 5,75 5,75 3,75 4 3,75 3,25 5,5 5 5,75 5,5 4,5 5 6 6 
Ukraine 4,75 5,75 3 3,5 2,75 2,5 3,5 4 5,25 5 4,75 5,75 5,75 5,75 
Sources: Freedom House, “Nations in Transit” (2017), https://freedomhouse.org/report/nations-
transit/nations-transit-2017. 
 
Azerbaijan registered a deterioration of the situation in what concerns 
all of the 7 criteria, of which the largest attack was on civil society and on the 
independence of justice. In Armenia, five criteria marked the worsening of the 
state, while other two (independent media and corruption) had a slight 
improvement. In Belarus, whose participation in the EaP was always limited 
almost exclusively to the multilateral track and dialogue between the EU and 
non-governmental organisations, the situation is similar after a decade – a slight 
improvement in three criteria, and only one (judicial independence) marked a 
slight deterioration. 
In contrast to Azerbaijan, Georgia is an example of a country where the 
state of affairs has improved, albeit slightly, by all criteria, with the exception of the 
judicial independence, which remained at the same level. In Moldova, instead, 
indicators of “electoral process” and “judicial independence” deteriorated, 
“corruption” remained at the same high level (6). In Ukraine, the indicators 
have worsened by five criteria over the past ten years: “national democratic 
governance”, “electoral process”, “media independence”, “local democratic 
governance” and “judicial independence” and the level of corruption remained 
as high (5.75) as it was ten years ago. Only the “civil society” index, which is 
already the highest among all six countries, has improved from 2.75 to 2.5. 
For all the states, including EU associate partners, the worst indicators 
are in the areas of national democratic governance, independence of justice and 
corruption. At the same time, the best situation refers to the area of civil society, 
with the exception of Azerbaijan. The given data illustrate well the biggest 
obstacles to modernisation and Europeanisation of the EaP participants: a 
reluctance of political elites to carry out the reforms (e.g. fighting corruption, 
ensuring the rule of law, independence of the judicial system, etc.) that threaten 
their power and existence. The most striking examples in this sense are 
Moldova and Ukraine. 
Since a coalition of the liberal democratic parties “Alliance for 
European Integration” took power in Moldova in 2009, the EU made big bids 
on this country aiming to find a “success story” of the EaP. The new authorities 
have achieved a lot, for example, quickly fulfilled the requirements of the Visa 
Liberalisation Action Plan with the EU, which allowed the country, the first of 
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the EaP states, to have a visa-free regime with the EU in April 2014. However, 
the “facade Europeanisation” in Moldova47 of the previous years continued: 
new laws were adopted, and new institutions created in order to present results 
to Brussels, while their implementation and effectiveness were undermined by 
the same institutions that created them. The biggest problem remained the 
division of power between two most influential oligarchic clans in the country, 
controlled by the informal leader of the Democratic Party, Vladimir Plahotniuc 
while his rival, Vladimir Filat, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party. The 
EU considered the latter “a good oligarch” for quite some time, especially when 
he was the prime minister, and Mr Plahotniuc was a “bad oligarch”. However, 
Filat’s government, on which the EU was counting so much, was the most 
corrupt. During his premiership, one billion dollars was stolen from three banks, 
equal to 12% of the country’s GDP48. The arrest and imprisonment of Filat and 
the formation of a new government in 2015 did not restore the confidence in 
pro-European political forces in the country as instead of two oligarchs, only 
one started ruling the country, Vladimir Plahotniuc. The support for European 
integration has dropped more than twice compared to 2008 because of the 
corruption scandal and a political crisis, and reached about 30% by the end of 
2015
49
. The disappointment with European integration, which became a cover 
for corruption, made possible the election of a pro-Russian president Igor 
Dodon in 2016, who, in fact, is secretly supported by Vladimir Plahotniuc
50
. 
Meanwhile, the implementation of the association agreement and other reforms 
related to European integration has significantly slowed down. 
Today, it is important for the EU to avoid making the same mistake in 
relations with Ukraine that it has made in Moldova such as the support for self-
proclaimed “eurointegrators”, despite proofs of corruption and discrediting the 
idea of European integration, especially before the presidential elections in 
2019. Ukraine is the largest, the most important and problematic state in 
assessing the impact of the EU initiatives on the development of post-Soviet 
states in Eastern Europe. It may be considered a test to determine the 
effectiveness of the EU’s transformational force in the region since the stability 
                                               
47  Cristian Ghinea and Victor Chirilă, “EU – Moldova Negotiations. What is to be 
Discussed, What Could be Achieved?”, Romanian Center for European Policies (CRPE), 
Foreign Policy Association (APE), 05 May 2010, p. 23, 
http://www.crpe.ro/eng/library/files/crpe-ape,eu_–_moldova_negotiations.pdf. 
48  Aliona Hetmanchuk, “From ‘history of success’- to ‘oligarchic dictatorship’. What 
lessons Ukraine should take from Moldova”, Dzerkalo tyzhnia. Ukraina, 18 November 
2017. 
49  Leonid Litra, “The crisis is beneficial for Moldova,” Dzerkalo tyzhnia. Ukraina, 30 
October 2015. 
50  Aliona Hetmanchuk, “From ‘history of success’…cit.”; Andrew Wilson, “Partners for 
Life” …cit. 
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and success of reforms in this country have a significant impact on the security 
of the EU. 
After “the Revolution of Dignity”, a significant progress has been made 
in Ukraine in reforming certain areas such as budget stabilisation, the reform of 
some types of public procurement, of the energy sector, which has traditionally 
been a major object of interest of the Russian press, the creation of anti-
corruption institutions, and the construction of an army from scratch. It 
happened due to the rise of social activity, the arrival of some reformers (mostly 
civilians), the greater involvement of the West and of the EU in particular, as 
well as circumstances of “force majeure” such as the annexation of Crimea, the 
beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict in Donbas, and the fall of trade and 
of the financial system in 2014-2015. In those areas where the pressure of the 
West, and of civil society was smaller, progress was minimal such as the reform 
of state-owned enterprises, or the land reform, etc. At the same time, as the 
unfolding of the reforms progressed, the opposition to them increased as soon as 
they became a threat to the interests of the elites. As Oleh Rybachuk, one of the 
founders of the civic movement “Chesno”, noted, “Ukrainians have learned to 
sabotage that element of the mechanism [of reform implementation] that 
undermines everything”51. 
On August 15, 2016, Ukraine launched an unauthorised electronic 
declaration system for high officials, which did not correspond to the objectives of 
securing of the main legal consequences, which should be the result of the 
submission of false declarations. Only under pressure from the EU and the IMF, 
and the risk of losing the visa free regime with the EU, a $3 billion loan from the 
IMF and a 1.2 billion euro of financial aid from the European Union, Ukraine had 
to abandon the breakdown of e-declarations. In this situation, the Ukrainian 
authorities had no other choice than to return to the system certification: due to the 
urgent meeting held by President Poroshenko with directors of Ukrainian anti-
corruption organisms, it was agreed to immediately issue the certificate of 
conformity of the electronic declaration system by August 31
52
. 
As Andrew Wilson notes, during the first two years after the revolution 
of 2014, it became clear that the stakeholders blocked key reforms
53
. In the 
summer and autumn of 2017, the authorities began to frankly oppose the 
reforms that threatened their power and existence. Some semi-authoritarian 
practices and dirty political tricks of Viktor Yanukovych have been revived. 
                                               
51  Andrew Wilson, “Partners for Life” …cit. 
52  Serhiy Sydorenko, “Money in exchange for reforms: why Bankova refused to break the e-
declaration system?,” Europeiska pravda, 18 August 2016, http://www.eurointegration.com. 
ua/articles/2016/08/18/7053523/. 
53  Andrew Wilson, “Survival of the Richest: How Oligarchs Block Reform in Ukraine”, 
European Council on Foreign Relations, 14 April 2016, http://www.ecfr.eu/ publications/ 
summary/survival_of_the_richest_how_oligarchs_block_reform_in_ ukraine6091. 
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The autumn campaign against Mikheil Saakashvili who broke up the alliance 
with the President Poroshenko and lost Ukrainian citizenship became an 
alarming symptom of how the judiciary and security apparatus were again 
drawn into the process of massacre with political opponents. 
At the same time, the political forces in power began to dismantle the 
most effective anticorruption agency that has ever functioned in Ukraine, the 
National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU).  
On 6
th
 December 2017, Yehor Soboliev, Self-Reliance Party MP, was 
dismissed from the position of the head of the anti-corruption committee. The 
representatives of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc and the People’s Front registered 
the same day a draft law according to which the Director of NABU, the head of 
the anti-corruption prosecutor’s office, any member of the National Agency on 
Corruption Prevention (NACP), and a director of the newly established State 
Bureau of Investigations
54
 could be dismissed without any audit. That could 
have radically changed the influence of the Parliament on the system to combat 
corruption. In case of the approval of this law, all anticorruption authorities 
would have been subordinated to the pro-government coalition and would have 
turned into a political instrument. The international pressure of the US, the EU 
and the IMF
55
 did not allow the parliament to vote on this bill, but it still 
remains in the Verkhovna Rada and may be put to the vote at any time as soon 
as the West is diverted to other things. 
Worrisome process of the anti-corruption courts introduction has 
become an illustrative example of anti-corruption reforms blockage by the 
authorities, which could become the last link of an effective process to combat 
corruption. Despite the earlier commitment to the EU to create such courts in 
summer 2017, Poroshenko spoke about an alternative option, such as the 
creation of special “anti-corruption chambers” in the existing courts, whose 
independence is out of the question. The intensification of pressure from the US 
and the EU forced the President to submit on December 13, 2017 a draft law on 
the creation of an anticorruption court
56
, but this document ignores the advice of 
the Venice Commission and does not provide the necessary independence from 
the political and judicial hierarchy as the IMF, The World Bank and the EU
57
 
                                               
54  Verchovna Rada of Ukraine, Draft Law “On Amendment of the Certain Laws of Ukraine 
on Provision of Parliamentary Control”, http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/ 
webproc4_1?pf3511=6308. 
55  Serhiy Sydorenko, “A step from the abyss: the night when Ukraine almost lost its visa-
free regime,” Europeiska pravda, 07 December 2017, http://www.eurointegration.com. 
ua/articles/2017/12/7/7074727/. 
56  Verchovna Rada of Ukraine, Draft Law on the Supreme Anti-corruption Court, 
http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=63218. 
57  What the IMF requires: full text of a letter from Washington to Bankova, Europeiska 
pravda, 15 January 2018, http://www.eurointegration.com.ua/articles/2017/12/7/7074727/. 
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rigorously stated. There is hope that their demands will have an effect; 
otherwise, other achievements will be under threat. 
E-declarations on income and property of civil servants have not yet 
resulted in any criminal investigations. This occurs because the NACP, which 
should check the declarations, is under the control of the oligarchs
58
. Finally, in 
the summer and autumn of 2017, the persecution of anti-corruption activists, 
non-governmental organisations and investigative journalists intensified. In 
August, a criminal case was opened against Vitaliy Shabunin, head of the Anti-
Corruption Action Centre
59
. 
By these actions, Ukrainian authorities attempted to eliminate the 
progress in ensuring the rule of law, the fight against corruption and the division 
of powers that has been achieved in Ukraine since “the Revolution of Dignity”. 
According to Gustav Gressel, “If this continues, Ukraine will again be a quasi-
authoritarian kleptocracy in which few holders of power use the state apparatus 
to advance their private interests”60. 
Many politicians in Ukraine, like in other countries of Eastern Europe 
and the South Caucasus, privilege their interests rather than public ones. As 
Leslie Holmes noted, “successful post-communist world officials are not 
directly interested in introducing political transparency or the rule of law in 
economics and politics”61. Taking the countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
as an example, Milada Anna Vachudova proves that governments of the non-
liberal model are ready to sacrifice the abstract advantages of EU membership 
in order to protect their political and economic interests
62
. The implementation 
of EU requirements will bring significant short-term losses for the ruling elites 
because of increased transparency and competitiveness. The transparency will 
result in the loss of profits from illegal economic schemes that are “protected” 
by politicians and enable rapid enrichment. Therefore, it seems more useful for 
the political elite to maintain the status quo rather than provide reforms for the 
long-term benefits of state and society. It is difficult to alter such system 
because all those who are able to make the change do not really need any 
changes because the system is satisfactory for them. 
                                                                                                                   
57  New requirements for the Anti-corruption court: what the World Bank added to the 
conflict between Kyiv and the IMF, Europeiska pravda, 16 January 2018, 
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57  The EU made a statement on the Anti-corruption Court with a hint of a visa-free regime 
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58  Gustav Gressel, “Ukraine on the brink of kleptocracy … cit.”. 
59  Andrew Wilson, “Partners for Life” …cit. 
60  Gustav Gressel, “Ukraine on the brink of kleptocracy … cit.”. 
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The problem for the EU lies in the fact that the Ukrainian elites are 
acting under the cover of European integration. Therefore, as it happened earlier 
in Moldova, the private enrichment of alleged “pro-European” politicians would 
only discredit the EU and diminish its influence on the transformational 
processes in Ukraine. We agree with Gustav Gressel’s view that Europe should 
resist Ukraine’s officials sooner than later63. However, in its policy towards 
Ukraine, the EU is tucked between two potential dangers. On the one hand, the 
EU tries not to confront the Ukrainian officials in order to avoid undermining 
Ukraine’s struggle for independence and sovereignty against Russia. On the 
other hand, the EU is afraid to grant more legitimacy to the corrupted power. 
Any arguments that Ukraine should be allowed to focus only on war are a 
dangerous illusion. Corruption and sovereignty are separate issues that should 
be considered as such. If the Ukrainian authorities fail to accomplish their 
promises to combat the corruption or ensure the rule of law (as required by the 
Association Agreement with the EU), it should have consequences, regardless 
of its struggle with Russia. 
It is obvious that the EU does not want to use the threat of suspension of a 
visa-free regime because it will harm the average Ukrainian instead of the corrupt 
elite. The freezing of European assets of the most corrupt representatives of the 
Ukrainian government would be a much better instrument that will give a clear 
signal to the Ukrainian society on the eve of the 2019 presidential and 
parliamentary elections
64
. In any case, the EU as well as the United States and the 
IMF, must adhere to harsh conditions in relations with Ukraine in order to prevent 
local authorities from abandoning the reforms that harm the acquisitive interests of 
local elites. At the same time, Western governments should continue to support and 
protect the Ukrainian civil society, which, together with Western pressure, is a key 
to maintaining the impulse for reforms. 
 
 
Russia’s Influence In The Region 
 
Many problems of the EaP partner states stem from the reluctance of 
the Russian Federation to respect their sovereignty and the attempt to preserve 
its “sphere of influence” in the post-Soviet space. Since the inauguration of the 
ENP in 2004, and later the EaP, Russia has not concealed its concern that with 
the spread of European standards in Eastern Europe, it will inevitably gravitate 
towards the EU. By introducing the ENP, the EU has penetrated into a region 
that Moscow sees as a zone of its vital national interests. Since then, the post-
soviet Eastern Europe has created a space of international competition for the 
influence between the two centres of power, the EU and Russia, where the 
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“European neighbourhood”, in the sense of the ENP/EaP, collides with Russia’s 
“near abroad”. The EaP was not launched against Russia and was designed in a 
way to avoid such confrontation with it. It appeared, however, that for Russia, 
any activities of the EU in Eastern Europe are perceived as hostile. Russia 
began to look for ways to stop the European integration of the EaP countries. 
The traditional measures to prevent the spread of Western values and 
standards in the post-Soviet space and the withdrawal of EaP partners from its 
sphere of influence are that Russia include trade sanctions, restrictions on the 
export of energy resources, influence on internal political processes through its 
agents, information wars, escalation of “frozen conflicts”, support of local 
separatists, and military intervention. In addition, the formation of an alternative 
integration space in the form of the Eurasian Economic Union, created in 2015, 
has accelerated. Despite the weak economic base, the Eurasian Economic Union 
has a tougher organisational structure than its predecessors do, and the project is 
actually being implemented. Moreover, Russia regards it as a real instrument for 
the re-integration of the post-Soviet space, including the EaP countries (Belarus 
and Armenia today). 
Despite these measures of Russia, the EU made a historic step by 
signing the AAs at the end of June 2014, including deep and comprehensive 
free trade areas with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. However, given Russia’s 
public fears that Ukraine’s free trade agreement with the EU would have a 
negative impact on Russia’s economy, EU-Russia-Ukraine tripartite 
consultations were launched in the spring of 2014 at the interagency level to 
discuss this issue. In the context of escalation of the conflict in Ukraine, its 
great losses in the fight against Russian terrorist forces and the difficult 
economic situation, the EU decided on the 12
th
 of September 2014 to postpone 
the beginning of the economic part of the AA for 14 months. Under pressure 
from Russia, the adjourning of the entry into force of the chapter on free trade 
until the 1
st
 of January 2016 confirmed the fact that Russia became an informal 
player with a veto right in bilateral relations between Ukraine and the EU
65
. 
Such unprecedented practice is a threat to the entire EaP policy. However, at the 
same time with trying to find a compromise with Russia regarding the AA trade 
section with Ukraine entry into force, the EU began to impose sanctions on 
Moscow because of the annexation of Crimea and interference in Donbas, and 
unilaterally opened access for goods to its market for Kyiv. 
The “Russian factor” in EU relations with the EaP countries remains 
controversial in scientific and public discourse in Europe. Among the political 
realists, there is a widespread perception that the EaP violated the balance of 
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power in Eastern Europe, so Russia was forced to defend itself and take steps to 
rebuild it. This caused Russia’s aggressive actions on the territory of Ukraine. 
Boris Johnson, British Foreign Secretary, assumed that the EaP was the reason 
for Russia’s war against Ukraine in 201466. According to Andrew Wilson, the 
elements of the isolationist policy regarding the former Soviet space which 
argue the EU has nothing to do there because it belongs to Russia’s sphere of 
influence are quite realistic
67
. 
Similar considerations are also defended by researchers the other side of 
the Atlantic. For example, Professor John J. Mearsheimer of the University of 
Chicago who is a prominent neorealist representative argues that the United 
States and their European allies, who have been providing very active policies 
in the region, are primarily responsible for the crisis in Ukraine, and not Russia. 
“[…] the West had been moving into Russia’s backyard and threatening its core 
strategic interests, a point Putin made emphatically and repeatedly”68. 
According to him, the conflict proves that “U.S. and European leaders 
blundered in attempting to turn Ukraine into a Western stronghold on Russia’s 
border. Now that consequences have been laid bare, it would be an even greater 
mistake to continue this misbegotten policy”69. Therefore, the only solution is to 
restore the balance of power, recognize the influence of Russia and suspend the 
initiatives of NATO and the EU in the region
70
. 
This approach is still marginal in the EU’s public space and it has not 
forced the EU to reduce its commitment to the EaP. However, the opposite 
approach when the EU’s withdrawal from the region will only deepen its 
instability, as indicated by Wilson
71
 or Kobzova
72
, is not dominant. There are 
reasons to believe that until the EU reaches an agreement on how to develop 
relations with Russia, there will be no significant strengthening of the EaP. 
The EU’s eastern strategy of “avoiding problems in relations with 
Russia” in recent decades, was unsuccessful in terms of its results. Despite the 
reluctance of the EU to confront Russia, it will inevitably collide with it if it 
really wants to promote democratisation, modernisation and the gradual 
integration of the countries of Eastern Europe and South Caucasus into it, as 
this directly contradicts Russian interests in the region. The EU must not leave 
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the region and stop supporting those Western-oriented states. In many aspects, 
the EU has already won in the region – Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are 
trying to avoid the embrace of Moscow and seek a further rapprochement with 
Brussels. This “victory” though also means more responsibility: in search of 
potential compromises, including those with Russia, where possible, the EU should 
be ready to confront the latter and assist the states of the EaP, if necessary. 
Instead, the EU’s refusal to support the transformation of its Eastern 
Neighbourhood, which will unleash Russia’s plans, does not guarantee the 
restoration of stability in the region, and, as the situation in Ukraine shows, it 
could lead to even more threats to the EU. If Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia are 
left alone, Russia will start new aggressive attempts to limit their sovereignty. 
The Western-oriented citizens of these states will oppose in response, which 
could lead to further destabilisation. 
This time, after the Russian annexation of Crimea and its military 
aggression in Eastern Ukraine, if the EU returns to the “business as usual” 
principle that is the normalisation of economic relations, lifting sanctions and 
restoration of political dialogue in its relations with Russia as it did after the 
Russo-Georgian conflict in 2008, it will mean that EU is ready to tolerate any 
Russian behaviour beyond a red line depicted by the Kremlin on the map of 
Europe. After that, any activity of European institutions in the post-Soviet space 
will be impossible without Russia’s consent. If the EU does not want to repeat 
the 2008 mistake, then sanctions and other restrictive measures against Russia 
should be maintained until the conditions that led to their implementation change. 
The revision of the EaP requires taking into consideration certain difficult 
matters that leave the partner countries open to Russian influence, primarily in the 
economic, energy, and information spheres, and the formation of relevant positions 
at the EU level. If the EU has a direct interest in minimising the influence of Russia 
in the EaP countries, the best way out is to help them “build” their independence 
and resist Russia’s attempts to confront their sovereignty, rejecting any opportunity 
for Russia to gain an informal veto on co-operation between EU and the EaP states. 
 
 
Weak Incentives Of The European Union 
 
The incentives that the EU provides within the EaP are traditionally 
formulated as “three Ms”: Money, Markets and Mobility73. They are offered 
within the framework of the AAs, which have set the benchmarks for political 
and economic reforms in order to move to the EU’s rules and standards: EU 
financial assistance for reforms, partial access to the EU common market 
provided by deep and comprehensive free trade areas, which operate in 
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conditions of legislative and technical harmonization, and the liberalisation of 
the visa regime. 
Although individual countries have demonstrated more or less tangible 
progress in implementing certain parts of the programme, the EaP did not show, in 
general, the ability to stimulate radical internal transformations in Eastern Europe 
and their rapprochement with the EU, similar to the transformational force of EU 
enlargement policy. The basic constraint of the EaP is not much in the quality of 
programmes, projects, mechanisms, or even the volume of resources involved, but 
rather in its very essence, which is the alternative to the enlargement policy, and the 
absence of important incentive that would push the EU partners to the necessary 
changes – the prospects of membership. The EaP, as well as the enlargement 
policy, is based on the conditionality principle (to get x you have to make y), but its 
main incentives, free trade and free movement of the population, are not as 
attractive as full membership of the EU, and affordable financial assistance is not 
enough to offset the costs of comprehensive reforms. Frank Schimmelfennig and 
Hanno Scholtz think that the effect of the conditionality principle within the 
framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy is doomed to failure due to the 
lack of membership prospects
74
. 
The AAs with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are also built on the 
conditionality principle, but the costs of implementing the necessary reforms 
will remain high. Therefore, it is unclear how these agreements can contribute 
to the implementation of the necessary legislative and practical changes. Deep 
and comprehensive free trade areas promise the eastern neighbours an access to 
the EU internal market. The proposal is certainly generous, but somewhat 
blurred, distant and expensive in terms of short and medium-term prospects for 
the neighbours. The EU’s strategy is based on gaining advantages by the 
neighbouring countries from access to the EU internal market. This access, 
however, depends on compliance with the rules and standards of the internal 
market, and, therefore, the EU proposes the neighbouring countries to adopt a 
significant part of the acquis that regulates the functioning of the internal 
market (about 80%). As to the EaP partners, such a proposal poses a significant 
challenge not only because of the lack of legal and administrative capacity to 
adopt and implement the acquis, the need for change in established business 
practices, but also because of the inevitability of significant costs. The CEE 
countries that joined the EU made such expenditures for the sake of 
membership (including access to EU structural funds). The EaP does not 
provide such motivation. Most of the financial assistance provided by the EU to 
the EaP countries is represented by credit assistance, and not by grants. For 
                                               
74  Frank Schimmelfennig, Hanno Scholtz, “EU Democracy Promotion in the European 
Neighbourhood: Conditionality, Economic Development, and Linkage”, (paper for EUSA 
Biennial Conference), Montreal, 2007, p. 3. 
236  TETIANA SYDORUK, DMYTRO TYSHCHENKO 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVIII  no. 2 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
example, in the case of Ukraine, the grants represent only 6% of the total EU 
assistance
75. The model of “integration without membership”76, proposed by the 
EU within the EaP, does not have tools to stimulate truly deep reforms. 
It is generally acknowledged that in order to increase the efficiency of 
the EaP, the EU should offer new incentives for pro-European partners. The 
prospect of EU membership appears to be the biggest incentive for Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine to continue the move towards European integration. It is 
not just about declarations that ensure, for example, that the EU’s door remain 
open for the EaP countries, but the assurances that, depending on progress in 
internal reforms, the EU is really ready to begin a pre-accession process with 
these countries. Only in this case, the association agreements, as a step towards 
the integration process, can provide long-term effectiveness of the EaP. 
This it is not an acceptable solution for many EU countries whose 
number has grown in recent years. For instance, the Netherlands permanently 
block the official recognition of the “European aspirations” of the eastern 
neighbours by the EU after the April 2016 referendum on ratification of the 
Association Agreement with Ukraine. Hungary threatens to veto any deepening 
of relations between Ukraine and the EU after a new law on education came 
into force in Ukraine in September 2017, which limited the teaching of minority 
languages. After the start of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, Europeans were 
fearful that the steps towards the EU enlargement in this direction would lead to 
Russia’s countermeasures and further destabilisation. According to Daniela 
Schwarzer, a political expert at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, 
European politicians must first convince their people that such incentives as the 
prospect of membership are necessary
77
. This can only become a reality if the 
partner countries demonstrate clear progress and readiness to implement the 
necessary reforms. The current “fluctuations” in the reforms taking place in 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia do not contribute to this. 
In this situation, the EU can propose intermediate steps towards full 
membership in order to support a more ambitious policy towards its eastern 
neighbourhood. Researchers from the Lithuanian Eastern Europe Studies 
Centre
78
 offer interesting and logical ideas in this context. In their view, “the 
golden mean” between the two poles, that is de facto suspension of the EaP or 
the rapid granting of membership prospects to partner countries could be an 
Action Plan or a Roadmap, which provides the prospect of membership 
proposed for each country. It should be a roadmap for reforms based on 
standard principles in the direction of compliance with the Copenhagen criteria 
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but differentiated for each country, taking into account their main problems, the 
fulfilment of which will make it possible for EU membership prospects. 
Providing such a Roadmap will be an incentive for reforms, and thus will 
“throw the ball” into the hands of the EaP countries, as they will have to reach 
the goals set by the EU: to implement the EU rules and standards before the 
latter takes a politically difficult decision on the prospect of membership
79
. 
Indeed, the experience of implementing the Visa Liberalisation Action 
Plans by Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine has shown a significant impact of the 
EU conditionality principle, when the conditions are set out clearly, and the 
promised rewards are noticeable. All three countries have demonstrated 
significant progress in implementing migration reforms, fighting corruption, 
improving border control and human rights. It is hard to believe that the reforms 
launched under the visa liberalisation process would become a reality without 
remuneration from the EU. 
Currently, Brussels emphasises the need for these countries to 
implement the AAs over the next decade. Nevertheless, politically it is unlikely 
to be attractive, and we consider the EU ought to propose new intermediate 
incentives that would give a clear signal to associated partners about the 
prospects for their European integration. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine should 
be gradually linked to the prospect of joining the EU, which would allow them 
to be considered as potential candidates under certain conditions. 
An alternative to the above-mentioned Roadmaps on membership 
prospects can be a definition of a clear list of top priorities within the AAs 
implementation with rigid criteria for real progress and limited timeframes; and 
after taking into consideration the results, the EU will make a decision whether 
to provide a European perspective for each of the three countries or not. This 
will mean a focus on the proper implementation of the AAs by Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine over the coming years, and they will be able to pass an 
official assessment and get (or not) the desired prospect of EU membership. 
Such an approach will allow EU Member States that have a negative attitude 
towards the idea of further enlargement eastwards to control the development of 
relations with partner countries and suspend them if the results of the reforms 
are unsatisfactory. On the other hand, for the EaP partner states, it will mean 
that after the results of fulfilling the specific conditions made by the EU, they 
will have the opportunity to move to a higher level of relations and be 
recognised the status of a potential candidate for EU membership. 
An analysis of the economic and political indicators of Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine, of their position in various international ratings 
(corruption index, freedom index, global competitiveness index, level of public 
debt on GDP, etc.) and their comparison with the indicators of the Western 
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Balkans in 2003, when the EU gave the latter the perspective of European 
integration
80
, show that, in most cases, the three Eastern European states are in a 
better position today than the Western Balkan states were then. Consequently, 
we can assume that a serious EU proposal that dispels doubts about its 
intentions regarding the EaP states and gives the latter a clear direction and 
ultimate goal can provide real impact of the EU on reforms similar to the pre-
accession process. However, going back to the EU’s historic decision on 
expansion in the Western Balkans region, it should be noted that there is, 
perhaps, a key difference that determines the specifics of the EaP as an 
alternative to enlargement. Unlike the Western Balkans, the EaP states are not 
an “empty space”, but a zone of “special Russian interests”. The more the 
capitals of the EU are inclined to take this factor into consideration, the more 
the EaP is deprived of any political symbolism and the partner states do not 
have a prospect of full membership in the EU. 
In this situation, the EaP should find intermediate tools to provide as 
much support for the gradual reform process as possible in order to maintain the 
enthusiasm of the reformers and avoid allowing those opposing the reforms to 
win. This may include the work directed towards a common economic space 
between the EU and associated Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine (as the European 
Economic Area), further support for civil society, independent media content, 
trans-European network enlargement, more active EU involvement in conflict 
resolution in the EaP countries and opening up new opportunities for them to 
operate within the framework of the Common European Security and Defence 
Policy as well as the implementation of popular initiatives such as the elimination 
of roaming charges, the integration of the energy union, or EU’s digital market, 
etc. It will not provide an immediate solution to all problems in the region, but it 
can reveal the potential of the EaP to facilitate a much deeper transformation of 
the EU’s eastern neighbours, strengthening their sovereignty and resilience to 
Russian pressure. The ultimate success of the EaP and the transformation of the 
programmes into more efficient, modern and prosperous democracies are 
impossible without a real prospect of their membership of the EU. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
It appears it is unlikely that the EU will make any major changes to the 
EaP in the coming years. It is now more concerned about its internal problems, 
                                               
80  Leonid Litra and Ivane Chkhikvadze, “The prospect of EU membership for Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine: impossible, forgotten or hidden?” Glavcom, 25 July 2016, 
https://glavcom.ua/publications/perspektiva-chlenstva-v-jes-dlya-gruziji-moldovi-ta-
ukrajini-nemozhliva-zabuta-chi-prihovana-363391.html. 
A Review of the Eastern Partnership after Ten Years: the Need to Reconsider its Efficacy 239 
Romanian Political Science Review  vol. XVIII no. 2  2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
due to which it has fewer resources and suffers from the lack of willingness of 
the member states to invest in the region. The pressure of populism, political 
realism, the fact that many member states tend to take into account the “Russian 
factor”, “fluctuations” in domestic reforms in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia 
also stand in the way of an ambitious revision of the EaP.  
However, with the condition that the EaP is more functional, it will still 
need to be reimagined. First, the EU must recognise political realities in the 
partner countries and adjust its expectations concerning reforms as well as 
policy towards governments and non-governmental forces. Secondly, a renewed 
approach to relations with partner countries should take into account their 
sensitivity to external pressures, namely the difficult matters that leave them 
open to Russia’s influence. The EU could propose ways that would minimise 
this influence in a sense of EU’s “soft power” enforcement in the nearest 
neighbourhood and the possibilities of countering the Kremlin’s “hard power”. 
Thirdly, the EU has to think about the intermediate incentives it can offer its 
pro-European neighbours (Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) in order to gradually 
make path to grant a status of potential candidates for membership in the face of 
the irreversibility of internal transformations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
